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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CityofOrem, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
Scott Ray Bishop, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case #20100962 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
**** 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant challenges the trial court's guilty verdict, arguing that the trial court 
admitted testimony, against Appellant's objections, from a witness the trial court deemed 
unqualified and unable to testify, the trial court refused to permit relevant evidence, the 
trial court failed to apply Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code Annotated, and Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, and the trial court failed to uphold Appellee's burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that these failures constituted irreversible error in direct 
harm to Appellant. 
Correction-of-Error Standard. See Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777,778-79 (Utah 
1992); State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct App. 1992)) ("[W]e consider the 
trial court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and review the trial 
courts interpretation of that law for correctness."); See State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930,933 
(Utah 1998); State v. Harlev. 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 17,18 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
"Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." Pena. 869 P.2d at 936; see State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476,478 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999) 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 31,2010, Appellant was charged by citation filed in Fourth District 
Court with Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-
6a-601. 
On September 8, 2010, Appellant appeared before the court clerk, pled not guilty 
to the charge, and posted bail in the amount of $90.00. 
On September 27, 2010, Appellant filed a Notice of Demand for Jury Trial. 
On October 26,2010, the Appellee changed the charge from a Class C 
Misdemeanor to an Infraction, and a bench trial was held. 
At trial, Appellant was found guilty and was ordered to pay a fine in the amount 
of $90.00. Judge Eyre ordered Appellant's previously posted bail, in the same amount, to 
be forfeited as payment-in-full of the fine. 
On November 24, 2010, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of Corporal Scott Rich 
On examination of Corporal Rich, the following were entered into the record. 
Corporal Rich testified that, on August 27,2010, he was running Lidar, a device 
used to measure the speed of a moving vehicle, at approximately 200 South 400 East 
(Orem High School) in Orem, Utah. 
Corporal Rich testified that, at approximately 5:15p.m., a vehicle, described as an 
Acura SUV, travelling North on 400 East, approached his position, that he made a visual 
estimate of the vehicle's speed to be approximately 10-15 miles per hour over the posted 
25mph limit, and checked the vehicle's speed with the Lidar unit, which registered a 
speed of 40mph, for a total of 15mph over the speed limit. 
Corporal Rich testified that, in making the traffic stop, 'the vehicle passed me; I 
pulled out of the driveway, turned on my overhead lights at which point the vehicle 
pulled over, and I made contact with the driver of the vehicle." Corporal Rich 
subsequently identified Appellant as the driver of the vehicle to which he was referring. 
Appellant objected on the grounds that testifying to such called "for a legal conclusion." 
When Judge Eyre questioned Appellant as to what the legal conclusion was, Appellant 
responded "the terms 'driver' and 'vehicle' are legally defined terms" to which Judge 
Eyre responded "they are everyday usage. I overrule the objection." 
Corporal Rich testified that he then issued a citation to the driver for Speeding. 
On cross-examination of Corporal Rich, the following statements were entered 
into the record. 
Appellant to Corporal Rich: "On the citation that you issued, is there any place on 
there that would indicate an accident, an injury, a harm, anything like that?" 
Corporal Rich: "Yeah, there is a box you check if there was an accident that took 
place." 
Appellant: "And, did you indicate that there was or was not an accident?" 
Corporal Rich: "No indication for an accident, no." 
Appellant: "Was there any accident?" 
Corporal Rich: "No." 
Appellant: "Was there any injury?" 
Corporal Rich: "No." 
Appellant: "Any harm to anyone?" 
Corporal Rich: "No." 
Appellant: "So, no loss whatsoever?" 
Corporal Rich: "No loss as far as...?" 
Appellant: 4CNo loss as far as the offense that I've been charged with." 
Appellee to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor, I'm going to object to this line of 
questioning. It doesn't go to whether or not he was speeding. It goes to whether or not 
there was an accident, which is irrelevant." 
Judge Eyre to Appellant: "What do you claim for it, Mr. Bishop?" 
Appellant proceeded to cite and quote from State v. Mauchlev, 67 P.3d 477,482 
(Utah 2003), regarding the minimum requirements to prosecute a criminal case (i.e, the 
injury or harm specified in the crime occurred, and this injury or harm was caused by 
someone's criminal activity). 
Judge Eyre: "Well, there are clearly victimless crimes, and Speeding is one of 
them." 
Appellant: "I've found nothing in this ruling to indicate that, Your Honor." 
Judge Eyre: "Well, proceed. You can make that argument at the conclusion of the 
case." 
Appellant to Corporal Rich: "So, Officer Rich, you did file this ticket, citation?" 
Corporal Rich: "I did." 
Appellant: "Is everything on this ticket true and accurate?" 
Corporal Rich: "Correct." 
Appellant: "Does the ticket present a valid cause of action?" 
Appellee to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor that calls for a legal conclusion." 
Appellant to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor, he has been able to answer things that 
require legal conclusions in prior testimony." 
Appellee: "Your Honor, asking an Officer whether or not a citation presents a 
valid cause of action in a criminal setting would be..." 
Judge Eyre: "I sustain the objection. It's not relevant to the court's 
determination." 
Appellant to Corporal Rich: "Does this ticket present every element of a crime 
having occurred?" 
Corporal Rich: "The ticket is issued for a Speeding citation, which was the 
Infraction that I observed at the time." 
Appellant: "Is Speeding a crime?" 
Corporal Rich: "It is." 
Appellant: "Is an Infraction a crime?" 
Corporal Rich: "It is." 
Appellant: "So, you are testifying that a crime occurred?" 
Corporal Rich: "Correct." 
Appellant: "Is it your testimony that in this case there is a valid cause of action?" 
Corporal Rich: "There is a valid cause of action, yes." 
Appellant: "Are you aware, Officer Rich, that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 
that for a valid cause of action to exist the injury alleged must be, for example, distinct 
and palpable and not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical...?" 
Appellee to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor, I'm going to object to the question's 
relevancy." 
Judge Eyre: "Sustained." 
Appellant to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor, he said that a crime occurred. He said that 
there was a valid cause of action. I'm simply asking if his..." 
Judge Eyre: "Those other follow-up questions were asking him to give an opinion 
as to a U.S. Supreme Court case, I presume. Clearly it's not in the purview of a Police 
Officer. Those are considerations for the court to determine, and you can make whatever 
legal arguments you want to the court. This witness is here to give information with 
respect to the facts of the case, not the legal issues." 
Appellant to Corporal Rich: "Officer Rich, where on this ticket is a distinct and 
palpable injury presented?" 
Corporal Rich: "There isn't one." 
Appellant: "Does this ticket present a justiciable case or controversy?" 
Appellee to Judge Eyre: "Your Honor, Fm going to object again to this line of 
questioning. It's not relevant. He's asking for a legal conclusion or legal opinions in the 
case." 
Judge Eyre: "Sustained." 
Appellant to Corporal Rich: "Officer Rich, have I been accused of violating 
someone's rights?" 
Corporal Rich: "No." 
Appellant: "So, this case does not involve the alleged violation of a legal right?" 
Corporal Rich: "Correct." 
Appellant: "How does someone acquire standing in a court case?" 
Appellee to Judge Eyre: "Objection. Same issue as before." 
Judge Eyre: "Sustained. This is not the purview of this particular witness, asking 
for a legal conclusion." 
B. Appellee's Summation 
Appellee stated in his summation "The offense of Speeding is the injury. It is a 
general public issue. It would be the injury to the general public, not to a specific 
individual thus giving rise for standing to the city to raise such a claim." 
C. Appellant's Summation 
Appellant stated in his summation "The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Mauchlev 
stated 'Generally, to establish guilt in a criminal case, the prosecution must show that [1] 
the injury or harm specified in the crime occurred, [2] this injury or harm was caused by 
someone's criminal activity.' [The witness] has testified that both foundations of a crime 
were not committed, that there was no injury, loss, or harm, to either himself or the City 
of Orem, that there was no violation of a legal right or duty either to himself or to the 
CityofOrem." 
Appellant continued, quoting State v. Mauchlev. supra, "'Under the 
trustworthiness standard, the state must still establish all elements of the offense, 
however, the elements may be established by independent evidence of the crime, a 
corroborated confession, or a combination of both/ There is no corroborated confession 
in this case, Your Honor, and there is no independent evidence of a crime." Judge Eyre 
responded "There is independent... There is independent evidence. That's what the 
officer testified to, that he observed a crime, and that crime... urn... Speeding ordinances 
and Speeding statutes have been upheld routinely by our Supreme Court and our Court of 
Appeals. I don't see any relevance of that case to these issues here." 
D. Appellee's Further Comments 
When asked by Judge Eyre if he had any further comments, Appellee stated "It is 
a General Welfare issue within the powers of the city and the state." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the trial court to convict Appellant on the charge of Speeding, the trial court 
must find the Appellant guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" based upon the evidence 
before it and in accordance with rules of the court, Utah Code Annotated, and precedents 
set by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals. This the trial court did not do. 
Upon cross-examination, Appellee's only witness in the case was declared by 
both Appellee and Judge Eyre, multiple times throughout the trial, unable to provide legal 
conclusions and legal opinions, yet this same witness was allowed by the court to provide 
legal conclusions for Appellee, in contradiction to Appellant's objections, a clear 
violation of fairness, justice and due process of law. 
If Appellee's only witness was not allowed to provide testimony regarding legal 
conclusions that would serve to provide a defense for Appellant, the testimony, in regards 
to all legal conclusions made by the witness, should have been stricken. This would, of 
course, include the citation, which included the initial legal conclusions made by the 
witness, without which Appellee could not have prevailed, leaving the court no choice 
but to find the Appellant not guilty. 
Furthermore, if Appellee's only witness were allowed to provide legal 
conclusions for Appellee, the trial court should have allowed questions by Appellant that 
could substantiate the credibility, substance, and sufficiency, or the lack thereof, of the 
complaint. This the trial court did not do to the harm of Appellant. 
Additionally, the trial court failed to correctly apply State v. Mauchlev, supra, 
absent any citations to any opposing case law, to the case at hand, a failure which, if 
remedied, would also have left the trial court no choice but to find the Appellant not 
guilty. 
Finally, Appellee failed to produce any evidence to show that Appellant had 
committed the crime of Speeding. 
Any or each of these elements would give rise to a question as to the validity of a 
finding of guilty by the trial court, and each is irreversible error on the part of the trial 
court causing harm to Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
According to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602, a witness may not testify to a 
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter. 
According to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401 and 402, all evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, is 
admissible. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, as stated in State v. Mauchley, supra, 
"'[t]o establish guilt' in a criminal case, "'the prosection [must] show that [1] the injury 
or harm specified in the crime occurred, [2] this injury or harm was caused by someone's 
criminal activity[.]" 
According to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-601, to prove that a vehicle was 
Speeding, Appellee must provide evidence that the vehicle was traveling at a rate of 
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, providing that a travel of speed greater 
than certain posted speed limits is prima facie evidence of Speeding (and therefore 
rebuttable), and that a gubernatorial proclamation in times of war or emergency may 
change the speeds which are considered prima facie evidence of traveling at a rate of 
speed that is unreasonable or imprudent under the existing conditions. 
Appellant challenges his conviction based upon [1] the improper admission of 
testimony by a witness who was ruled by the trial court several times to be unqualified 
and unable to testify, [2] the refusal by the trial court to permit Appellant to attack the 
sufficiency of the complaint, [3] the failure of the trial court to apply cited Utah Supreme 
Court decision, absent any cited opposing decisions, and [4] the failure of the trial court 
to uphold Appellee's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT I 
The trial court should have stricken or vacated any testimony produced by 
Corporal Rich because the court ruled him unable to testify. 
The citation provided by Corporal Rich to Appellant states certain facts, such as a 
description of Appellant, the direction of travel, the date, time and location of the traffic 
stop, etc. Corporal Rich's qualifications to determine these facts are not in dispute. 
However, in addition to these facts, Corporal Rich included his personal legal 
conclusions on the citation. These legal conclusions included Corporal Rich's legal 
opinion that Appellant was 'driving' a 'vehicle' and had committed the crime of 
'Speeding.' 
Further, upon examination before the court, Corporal Rich concluded that 
Appellant was the 'driver' of the 'vehicle' and had committed the crime of'Speeding'. 
The term 'driver' is defined at Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-102(34). 
The term 'vehicle' is defined at Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-102(72). 
The crime of'Speeding' is defined at Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-601(l). 
Appellant objected to these characterizations based upon the fact that Appellee 
had introduced no evidence that Corporal Rich was qualified to make these legal 
conclusions. Judge Eyre overruled these objections. No qualifications were ever entered 
into the record that Corporal Rich was qualified to make such legal conclusions, and, to 
the contrary, when Appellant cross-examined Corporal Rich about these and similar 
matters, Appellee objected to Appellant's lines of questioning based on the fact that the 
questions called for legal conclusions. Judge Eyre sustained Appellee's objections each 
time and specifically stated several times that Corporal Rich was in court to testify to the 
facts and not to answer questions which would require legal conclusions. 
Judge Eyre erred by testifying for Appellee that the usage for these terms "are 
everyday usage." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 605 states "The judge presiding at the 
trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to 
preserve the point." 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4(h) states that "Words and phrases used 
are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by 
law or have acquired a legal meaning." As these terms are each defined by Utah statute, 
their usage must be according to their statutorily-defined meaning and not their 'usual 
meaning.' 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602 states "A witness may not testify to a matter 
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, 
consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses." 
All testimony of Corporal Rich that included legal conclusions, which he, 
according to both Appellee and Judge Eyre, was unable or unqualified to make, should 
have been stricken or vacated from the record and thus not considered by the trial court in 
its decision. This is not within the discretion of the trial court. 
Without Corporal Rich's testimony as a witness, both on the citation and on the 
witness stand, Appellee would have no witness to the alleged crime and the trial court 
could not have found Appellant guilty 'beyond a reasonable doubt' as it would have had 
no evidence before it whatsoever. 
The trial court's admission of Corporal Rich's legal conclusions was a violation 
of Appellant's right to due process, and the conviction should be reversed. 
POINT II 
The refusal to permit Appellant to attack the sufficiency of the complaint was 
a denial of due process* 
""The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,234 U.S. 394 (1914). The hearing must be "at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,380 
U.S. 552 (1965)." Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254,268 (1970). 
"Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). In other words, [e]vidence that has even 
the slightest probative value is relevant under the definition in rule 401. Edward L. 
Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-2 (1996); see also Edward L. 
Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Rules of Evidence, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63,79 (stating 
that the general standard for [relevancy] is 'any1 probative value)." State v. Jaeger. 973 P. 
2d 404. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401 states ""Relevant evidence" means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402 states "All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution 
of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." 
"The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly 
from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the 
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested 
relief." Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984). 
"[S]tanding is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines... 
standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all 
stages of the litigation..." NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 US 249 
Whether or not a valid cause of action was before the trial court, whether or not 
that cause of action was justiciable, and whether or not there was standing to bring this 
case, were valid lines of questioning for Corporal Rich, who was Appellee's only witness 
and the individual responsible for bringing the cause of action to the trial court for 
adjudication. 
The trial court's refusal to permit Appellant to attack the sufficiency of the 
complaint was a violation of Appellant's right to due process, and the conviction should 
be reversed. 
POINT m 
Absent any citations in opposition to Appellant's defense, the trial court 
failed to apply cited Utah Supreme Court precedent 
In State v. Mauchlev, supra, a criminal case, the Utah Supreme Court changed the 
corroboration rule from the Corpus Delicti Rule to the Trustworthiness Standard. In 
discussing the previously-used Corpus Delicti Rule, the Court stated: 
Quotes Begin 
f 15 The corroboration rule is most "often termed the 'corpus deliciti' rule because 
the orthodox version of the rule requires corroboration of the corpus delicti, or body of 
the crime." [cites removed]. Here, the term "corpus delicti" means "evidence that the 
[charged] crime was committed." [cites removed]. Therefore, corroboration of the corpus 
delicti means to produce corroborative "evidence that the specified offense occurred." 
[cites removed]. 
f 16 Generally, "'[t]o establish guilt'" in a criminal case, "'the prosection [must] 
show that [1] the injury or harm specified in the crime occurred, [2] this injury or harm 
was caused by someone's criminal activity, and [3] the defendant was the [perpetrator].'" 
[cites removed]. The corpus delicti, or body of the crime, involves only the first two 
elements, however. Id. Hence, when the corpus delicti rule requires corroboration of the 
corpus delicti, it requires only corroboration that a harm or injury occurred by criminal 
act. [rest of paragraph removed]. 
f 17 For example, in a homicide case, the State must produce evidence that a 
person died and that the death was caused by a criminal act in order to establish that an 
injury or harm occurred by criminal means, [cites removed]. Once it produces such 
evidence, however, the State may then introduce a defendant's confession to establish 
other elements of the crime, such as intent or malice, [cites removed]. 
Quotes End 
In these few paragraphs, the Court clearly described the difference between the 
"corpus delicti" and the "corpus delicti rule;" the difference being the actual body of the 
crime in contrast to corroboration of the crime having occurred, usually by confession of 
the defendant. In paragraph 16, the Court gave the general description of the most basic 
elements of a crime that the prosecution must prove in any criminal case, though, of 
course, each crime may have further elements necessary to prove in order to gain a 
conviction. 
Continuing, the Court proceeded to describe the new corroboration standard to be 
used, known as the Trustworthiness Standard, stating: 
Quotes Begin 
|19 [...] Unlike the orthodox version of the corroboration rule, the new version 
focuses on the confession itself, [cites removed]. Specifically, "'the adequacy of 
corroborating [evidence] is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus delicti 
but by the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.'" [rest of 
paragraph removed]. 
f42 As early as 1909, this court applied the corpus delicti rule to all crimes. Thus, 
in all criminal trials the State is required to introduce evidence, independent of a 
defendant's confession, that a harm or injury occurred by someone's criminal act. [cites 
removed]. Since then, however, the classes of crime have become more numerous and 
"'modern statutes tend to define offenses more precisely and in greater detail than 
traditional case law.'" [cites removed]. As a result, defining the corpus delicti, or in other 
words, defining what the State must show to establish that the charged crime was 
committed before a confession may be admitted, [cites removed] has become more 
difficult and it has made the rule even more unworkable. 
f 49 Under the trustworthiness standard, the State must still establish "[a]ll 
elements of the offense." [cites removed]. However, the elements may be established by 
independent evidence of the crime, a corroborated confession, or a combination of both. 
Id. Thus, the State does not have to provide independent evidence that a harm or injury 
occurred by criminal act before a confession may be admitted to help establish guilt. 
|51 Substantial independent evidence supporting the trustworthiness of a 
confession need not necessarily include independent evidence of the crime. In cases such 
as this one, where there is no evidence of the crime independent of the confession, the 
State may nevertheless "establish the trustworthiness of the confession with other 
evidence typically used to bolster the credibility and reliability of an out-of-court-
statement." [cites removed]. 
Quotes End 
In these paragraphs, the Court points out that, where the Corpus Delicti Rule had 
to follow the establishment that a crime had occurred, the Trustworthiness Standard 
version of the corroboration rule simply had to evince a level of trustworthiness of the 
person giving the confession. However, as paragraph 42 points out, the necessity of 
proving the basic elements that a crime occurred has become more difficult not less 
stringent. The court goes further, in paragraph 49, by stating that the State must establish 
all elements of the offense, yet nowhere did the Court define the elements of any crime to 
be less than the bare minimum standards produced in paragraph 16, and, though the State 
"does not have to provide independent evidence that a harm or injury occurred by 
criminal act before a confession may be admitted," it is clear that it must still do so, 
whether before or after. Finally, in paragraph 51, the Court states that "where there is no 
evidence of the crime, independent of the confession, the State may nevertheless 
'establish the trustworthiness of the confession,'" thus pointing out, once again, that, as 
stated in paragraph 49, either independent evidence must exist to substantiate a crime 
having been committed and/or a confession must exist ("the elements may be established 
by independent evidence of the crime, a corroborated confession, or a combination of 
both.") 
There is no confession in evidence, and Corporal Rich testified under oath that 
there was no injury and there was no violation of a legal right. Thus Corporal Rich, 
himself, testified that the two most basic elements of a crime were absent in this case. 
Neither Appellee nor Judge Eyre cited any case in opposition to State v. 
Mauchlev, supra, to contradict Appellant's position. 
"Component parts of every crime are the occurrence of a specific kind of injury or 
loss, somebody's criminality as source of the loss, and the accused's identity as the doer 
of the crime; the first two elements are what constitutes the concept of "corpus delecti." 
U.S. v. Shunk. 881 F.2d 917,919 C.A. 10 (Utah). 
The trial court's failure to apply cited Utah Supreme Court decisions, absent any 
differing citation which Appellant might rebut was a violation of Appellant's right to due 
process, and the conviction should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
The trial court failed to uphold Appellee's duty to provide evidence proving 
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-601 states: 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, including when: (a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad 
grade crossing; (b) approaching and going around a curve; (c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and (e) approaching other hazards 
that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603, the 
following speeds are lawful: (a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as 
defined in Section 41-6a-303; (b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and (c) 55 miles 
per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603 is prima 
facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the 
speed limits on the highways of the state. 
Clause (1) provides that operating a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions is what constitutes Speeding, while Clause (2) 
provides for certain rates of speed that are lawful in certain locations, though not stating 
that other rates of speed are not lawful in other those or other areas, Clause (3) simply 
states that exceeding certain posted speed limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is 
not reasonable or prudent, and Clause (4) provides that the governor may change the rates 
of speed listed as prima facie evidence during certain times or in certain circumstances. 
No testimony was given to indicate that the speed of the alleged vehicle was 
unreasonable or imprudent, as attested to by Corporal Rich in his statements that there 
was no injury or harm and that no person's legal right had been violated, nor were any of 
the conditions in sub-clauses la-le, noted in the above paragraphs, in existence on the 
time and date in question, nor were any of them noted in Corporal Rich's testimony. 
These facts alone rebut the prima facie evidence of the posted speed limit element. 
The trial court's finding of guilty, absent any evidence of the alleged crime of 
Speeding, was a violation of Appellant's right to due process, and the conviction should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse his conviction on the charge of Speeding and 
order Appellant's payment for the fine refunded and returned. 
Se6tt Bishop £ 
Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that on this j/—day of"T*f*ut/**gy , 20 / / , two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were f hand-delivered X mailed to the 
Appellee at the following address: 
City of Orem, City Attorney 
56 North State Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
ADDENDA 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-102. Definitions, 
(10) "Drive" means: 
(a) to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway; and 
(b) in Subsections 53-3-414(1) through (3), Subsection 53-3-414(5), and Sections 
53-3-417 and 53-3-418, the operation or physical control of a motor vehicle at any 
place within the state. 
(ii) 
(a) "Driver" means any person who drives, or is in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle in any location open to the general public for purposes of vehicular 
traffic. 
(b) In Part 4, Uniform Commercial Driver License Act, "driver" includes any 
person who is required to hold a CDL under Part 4 or federal law. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-102. Definitions, 
(34) 
(a) "Motor vehicle" means a vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle 
which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not 
operated upon rails. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles moved solely by human power, 
motorized wheelchairs, or an electric personal assistive mobility device. 
(72) "Vehicle" means a device in, on, or by which a person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn on a highway, except devices used exclusively on stationary rails or 
tracks. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-60L Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate 
speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the 
governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, 
or highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603, the 
following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 41-6a-
303; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the limits provided 
in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603 is prima facie 
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful. 
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the speed 
limits on the highways of the state. 
Utah Code Annotated $ 78a-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who 
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. Definition of " relevant evidence/* 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal 
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness1 own testimony. This rule is subject 
to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 605. Competency of judge as witness. 
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection 
need be made in order to preserve the point. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses, 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless 
they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
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